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Abstract:

Smart grid infrastructure relies on information exchange between multiple actors in order to ensure system
reliability. These actors include but are not limited to smart loads, grid control, and energy management
technologies. As information exchange between these actors is susceptible to cyber-attacks, security and
privacy issues are indispensable to ensure a reliable and stable grid. This position paper proposes a privacypreserving, trust-augmented secure scheme for a smart grid implementation.

1

INTRODUCTION

The concept of a smart electric power grid can be
defined as a network of grid-interactive generators,
storage systems, and loads that exchange information to ensure system reliability, resource adequacy,
and economical provision of electrical power. Unlike the traditional electrical grids, where power is
uni-directional, power within a smart grid is instead
bi-directional. Grid-interactive devices can be managed efficiently to source, store, and consume power
as both demand and supply fluctuate (Adham et al.,
2022). Moreover, a smart grid relies heavily on automated digital interactions between its components.
This makes it an attractive target for all types of adversaries. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to address
the security of information exchanged between system actors and ensure customer information privacy.
For critical infrastructure like electric power systems, a cyber-attack could be catastrophic. Knowing
that information exchange within a smart grid is susceptible to cyber-attacks, it is imperative that system
designers address security and privacy problems to
ensure reliable and stable power systems. Multiple
industry standards have been developed for managing
information exchange within power systems, and several include security features, such as IEEE 2030.5
and OpenADR (Obert et al., 2019; Herberg et al.,
a
b
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2014; Obi et al., 2020).
Following industry standards with little understanding of the system to be developed may produce a complex system with undetected vulnerabilities (Myagmar et al., 2005). One systematic approach
to finding vulnerabilities of a system is through creating a threat model for the system at hand. The
creation of a threat model is an iterative process. It
requires one to repeatedly revisit the design and reexamine the interactions between the system components, identify the assets, and identify the threats. Implementing a threat model requires identifying security vulnerabilities and possible mitigation strategies,
which can serve as the foundation of the system’s security.
Identifying assets in threat modeling entails listing all resources to protect, either abstract or concrete. Identifying threats requires inspecting the possible goals of the assumed adversaries. There are several methods to identify common threats, such as relying on mnemonics like Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service,
Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE) or using frameworks
that utilize different metrics like Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Security Cards
(Bodeau et al., 2018). The process of drafting security
requirements necessitates reviewing all the identified
threats. For every threat, the goal is to manage its
associated risk by assessing whether to mitigate it or
accept it based on the threat’s severity and the likeli-
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hood of its occurrence.
To explore how this position paper addresses security threats and privacy-preserving features, we structured the manuscript as follows: A survey of related
work is presented in section 2. A brief overview of
Energy Grid of Things (EGoT) is presented in section
3. Adversary and thread models are considered in section 4. Privacy aspects of the EGoT are discussed in
section 5. Security within the EGoT is discussed in
section 6, and trust modeling for unpredictable attack
scenarios is presented in section 7. This is followed
by the conclusion in section 8.

2

RELATED WORK

There exists extensive prior work within the security
community related to smart grid security over the last
decade. Such work is the foundation of many new research trajectories, including ours. This section of the
paper presents closely-related work to our implementation. Moreover, we briefly discuss how our work
has been influenced by and differs from the examined
earlier work.
Salinas, Sergio, and Li propose two different algorithms to detect energy theft in smart grids (Salinas and Li, 2016). The authors provide a State Estimation with Kalman filter (SEK) algorithm that uses
Kalman filter for theft detection. However, SEK violates users’ privacy by using their characteristic load
profiles (current and voltage). The authors also propose a Privacy-Preserving Bias Estimation (PPBE)
algorithm, which preserves users’ privacy through
loosely decoupling filters. Finally, the authors show
that PPBE converges faster than SEK regarding truevalue bias estimation. Our work does not address energy theft detection. Moreover, load profiles in EGoT
are kept local instead of being shared with external
entities.
Defend and Kursawe present a privacy-preserving
implementation of the smart grid concept (Defend and
Kursawe, 2013). Their implementation makes use of
an Low-overhead Privacy Aggregation approach. The
implementation uses data aggregation and Homomorphic Encryption (HE) in smart meters to preserve the
privacy of customers. It also provides an assessment
of the scalability and integration of the approach with
standards like Device Language Message Specification and Companion Specification for Energy Metering. Finally, the authors show that their system poses
little overhead in CPU usage and the time needed to
perform encryption operations.
Wei-jing et al. present a similar approach, which
uses Paillier and El-Gamal signature algorithms to

protect user privacy (Wei-jing et al., 2019). The authors show that their proposed method also protects
users’ identities and power consumption. In the EGoT
smart grid implementation, we make use of data aggregation as a means of preserving privacy. We address this more in the privacy section of this paper.
However, we are not using HE to protect privacy. Instead, we use randomized energy requests to obfuscate the user’s behavioral patterns. Nonetheless, HE
shows promise as an additional layer of privacy protection that could complement our work in the future.
Deng, Zhuang, and Liang proposed a model for
a practical False Data Injection (FDI) attack against
state estimation in distribution systems (Deng et al.,
2019). The authors show that power flow in distribution systems can expose information that helps attackers estimate the system state. Furthermore, an
IEEE test feeder was used to simulate the FDI attack,
and the results showed that such an attack is plausible
to compromise the system. Contrary to the proposed
smart grid implementation, the addition of grid equipment requires out-of-band registration, which is outside the scope of EGoT scheme. Further, participating actors in EGoT must be authenticated and authorized by Grid Service Provider servers before processing received information. Finally, detective measures
are to be installed to validate sensors readings’ trustworthiness as another line of defense against such an
attack.

3

ENERGY GRID OF THINGS

Our implementation of the smart grid is referred to
as an EGoT. Three main layers make up the EGoT.
The power layer concerns the distribution of energy
to households. The network layer governs how Distributed Energy Resources (DER) within the EGoT
exchange information. And, the trust layer defines
the aggregate trust within the system. When a DER is
dispatched, the states of all three layers are affected:
through the network layer, the DER informs the aggregator of its availability and its energy and power
requirements; the trust layer monitors the information
exchange between actors and adjusts the trust scores
of those involved accordingly; and, within the power
layer, requested energy exchange occurs between the
Grid Operator and the DER.
The EGoT is an implementation of the smart grid
concept. It relies on the IEEE 2030.5 protocol, known
as the Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (anon., 2018a) to
communicate energy and power information, pricingrelated information, and scheduling to arrange resources for large-scale aggregated dispatch of DERs.
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DERs are grid-enabled, customer-owned generation,
storage, and load assets. These resources are located
behind customers’ meters and are not traditionally directly managed by utilities. DERs can be dispatched
to consume energy, like water heaters (Marnell et al.,
2020), or they can be configured to inject energy back
into the grid when it is needed, like inverter-based
systems (Hossain and Ali, 2013; Hoke et al., 2018).
Households that host DERs are referred to as ServiceProvisioning Customers (SPCs).
An EGoT system allows a Grid Service Provider
(GSP) to provide grid services1 to a Grid Operator
(GO) through the coordinated dispatch of large numbers of DERs. GOs use grid services to maintain
bulk power system frequency and voltages to ensure
reliable energy transfer, which can be negatively impacted by changes in load or variations in renewable
energy generation (Carvalho et al., 2008; Zarina et al.,
2012).
The EGoT system follows a server-client architecture, wherein the server is hosted by a GSP and the
Distributed Control Modules (DCMs) are the clients.
SPCs subscribe their DERs to GSP programs, which
can be dispatched to provide grid services based on
their availability, dispatch characteristics, and topological location. The GSP server provides a means for
a GO to requisition grid services through large-scale
aggregation and coordinated dispatch of DERs.
An Energy Services Interface (ESI) serves as a
demarcation boundary between GSP and SPCs (Lee
et al., 2013). It defines a set of rules regarding the information exchange between system actors on either
side of the boundary (Slay and Bass, 2021). These
rules define a bi-directional, service-oriented, logical interface that supports secure, trustworthy information exchange between the GSP and the SPCs’
DERs (Widergren et al., 2019). The ESI is bidirectional in that devices on the SPC-side can send requests to GSP servers and receive responses.
Due to the variability of DER manufacturers and
the heterogeneity of the protocols they obey, there
must be mechanisms for ensuring interoperability. Interoperability in an EGoT system is accomplished
through software and hardware support. DCMs
within the EGoT are tasked with expanding DER
functionalities such as the support of IEEE 2030.5
messaging, scheduling, and network communication.
Therefore, DCMs are the realization of hardware and
software support for interoperability.
The Distributed Trust Model (DTM) System is
an augmentation to existing security for the EGoT
system. The DTM System monitors information
1 U.S.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Guide
to Market Oversight Glossary”, March 15, 2016
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exchange between various energy grid actors and
provides measures of trustworthiness among the actors (Fernando et al., 2021). The DTM System consists of two parts: a Central Distributed Trust Aggregator (CDTA), located at the GSP, and numerous
DTM clients, located along with the DCMs at each of
the SPCs, as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Shown are the communication links between the
EGoT System actors (blue), the DTM System actors (red).
The DTM System monitors information exchange between
the EGoT System actors.

The DTM system expresses trustworthiness using
a Metric Vector of Trust (MVoT). Each DTM within
the SPC maintains an MVoT for each of the actors that
communicate with its DCM host. Consider DTMCa on the right side of Figure 1; this DTM is paired
with a DCM, which communicates with DER-a and
the GSP. So, the DTM maintains an MVoT for each
of these actors: DCM-a, DER-a and the GSP. The
MVoT includes 17 parameters. The DTM system
evaluates the participating actors and quantifies parameters such as trust, distrust, and certainty using the
MVoT.
The DTM at the SPC is responsible for evaluating and classifying messages to and from the DCM
and to populate the MVoT parameters based on information exchange between the DCM, its DER, and the
GSP. The DTM maintains an MVoT for each of these
actors. The CDTA is responsible for aggregating
all Distributed Trust Model Client (DTMC) MVoTs,
comparing the various MVoT parameters with threshold values, and sending messages/alerts to the appropriate authorities. Section 7 covers the architecture of
the DTM system in detail.

4

ADVERSARY AND THREAT
MODEL

The assumed adversary categories in EGoT include
tech-savvy users and nation-backed adversaries. The
class of tech-savvy users describes a group of users
who may have malicious intentions with limited resources to launch scathing attacks. Tech-savvy user
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skills might enable exposure of the system protocol
to identify and exploit undiscovered vulnerabilities.
The motivation for the tech-savvy users might be to
conduct further reconnaissance of a specific target or
game the system for financial incentives without revealing DERs identities to the GSPs. This can be done
with falsified DER identities.
Nations-backed adversaries already have the requisite expertise and resources to initiate destructive attacks to the grid (Liang et al., 2017; Langner, 2011).
Unlike tech-savvy users, nation-backed adversaries
have more resources, expertise, and motives to inflict real damage on the grid. State-level adversaries’
are motivated to cause financial losses, blackouts, or
other political damage. The complexity of attacks
they can instigate is much higher relative to the other
two categories.
Threats for the smart grid might be malicious and
could be caused by adversaries, unfriendly entities, or
due to errors such as equipment failure and administrative errors (Li et al., 2019). The latter type of threat
is out of the scope of this analysis. The following diagram depicts a network model of EGoT to highlight
interactions between actors.

Figure 2: Demonstrates the communication between the
different components of EGoT. The figure shows the interaction between the GO (left), GSP (middle), and a single
SPC (right).

As conveyed in Figure 2, the red dotted lines indicate trust boundaries with various trust levels. Further, circled numbers indicate a data exchange point
between actors. For brevity, the data flow within the
actors’ components is out of the scope of the analysis.
Similarly, the diagram excludes data flow within the
GOs site as well.
Since the EGoT relies on the voluntary participation of DERs to fulfill grid services, DERs are considered to be assets. Furthermore, GSPs are the primary actors responsible for managing grid services
through the dispatch of DERs. Therefore, any malicious attempts to target the availability of DERs or
GSPs pose a threat to the system’s stability. For example, communication between the GSP and SPCs is
routed through the internet shown in Figure 2. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeted at either party
may prove disastrous given that adversaries are aware
of the grid state and those grid emergencies require a

timely response (Kalluri et al., 2016).
Data consistency throughout the components of
the grid is also an abstract asset. Due to a FDI attack or other reasons, inconsistent data could cause
incorrect grid services to be carried out, which may
lead to an unstable electrical system (Deng et al.,
2019). Furthermore, the messages between GOs and
GSPs are routed through the internet, making them
vulnerable to cybersecurity threats (Pliatsios et al.,
2020). The corresponding point of data flow, number 2 in Figure 2, expresses a summary of grid conditions sent by the GSP to the GO, and the GO sends
its needs to the GSP. Any false communication could
lead to incorrect grid services being carried out. For
instance, spoofing the GO and instructing GSPs to
continue normal operations during grid emergencies
would be catastrophic (Teixeira et al., 2014; Isozaki
et al., 2016). Likewise, updating the GOs with erroneous grid states may lead the GO to take misguided
decisions (Deng et al., 2017).

5

PRIVACY

The principle of least privilege declares that entities
should receive the least amount of access required to
perform their functions (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975).
Knowledge of grid parameters and states is undoubtedly fundamental to GSP operation. Nonetheless,
knowledge of specific DER device information is not
crucial to GSP decisions for achieving operational objectives. For instance, knowing the energy consumption of a DER is unquestionably essential to deliver
energy to the DER; however, knowing the type of the
device is a piece of supplemental, unnecessary information to GSPs operation. Essentially, the ESI goals
are to keep DER-related information confined within
the SPC ’s personal domain and to minimize or obfuscate information that is needed for aggregate dispatch.
The privacy preservation goals call for ground
rules that govern actors’ interactions. As such, the
purpose of the ESI is the enactment of rules that promote privacy within the EGoT (anon., 2018b). For
instance, the ESI specifies that GSPs are to engage
with SPCs on an opt-in basis; this allows SPCs to decommit from a resource service at any time without
penalty. Therefore, SPCs initiates all communication
with the GSP.
The stability of the grid is partially dependent on
the GSP ’s control over resources during grid emergencies (anon., 2014). The ESI rules provide accommodation for DER control by the GSP. However, to
conform with the ESI rules, the SPC must be the one
to instigate and grant permission for the action. Ad-
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ditionally, the control must be temporary and not for
a non-deterministic period.
Data aggregation serves as an approach to preserve privacy. A drawback of data aggregation in a
real-world setting is the need for enough parties to
participate for this measure to be effective and practical. Another helpful technique is the randomization
of energy dispatch, which would also help preserve
privacy.
Localization of private information is the primary
approach used in this research. This preserves privacy by following the logic that information that is not
shared is hard to infer. However, this does not always
work as utility companies need access to information
that is partly sensitive. For example, estimating the
energy consumption of households could be beneficial for price estimation. Yet, this should not require
consumers to share their daily energy consumption
patterns. The previously mentioned example could
be expanded to an entire local area as opposed to an
individual household. This is done in the EGoT system through data aggregation by the GSP. That is, private data regarding the user is kept local to the SPC as
much as possible. When there is a need to share sensitive information, randomization is used before consumers request energy. Moreover, GSPs aggregate the
energy needs of an entire area such that utilities are
able to operate on the data in a useful manner without
infringing upon the customers’ privacy.

6

SECURING INFORMATION
EXCHANGE

Security for the EGoT is divided into two categories:
preventative measures and detective measures. The
preventive measures include encryption and authentication, as specified in IEEE 2030.5, while the DTM
System provides the detective measures. Both categories complement each other to mitigate the threats
mentioned in 4. For example, FDI behavior can be observed through unexpected signatures monitored by
the DTM system via abnormal MVoT values and inconsistencies of monitored messages. Attacks that
rely on flooding traffic are also flagged as abnormal
for violating the regular message frequency in MVoT
values. The following section expands on the detective measures provided by the DTM System.
IEEE 2030.5 protocol stack includes HTTPS with
TLS 1.2. This provides encryption and authentication
to secure messages over the internet. Certificate fingerprints, which are derived from hashing the device
certificate, are required during deployment and ongoing operations with GSP servers. This reduces the
114

system’s susceptibility to spoofing attacks. Furthermore, Access Control Lists (ACLs) are maintained by
the GSP to enforce authorization policies. Device permissions are verified before taking action when a request is received, which helps guard against attempts
to escalate privileges.

7

TRUST MODELING FOR
UNPREDICTABLE ATTACK
SCENARIOS

The sole responsibility of the DTM System is to monitor and alert authorities of any abnormal activities. It
is an augmented security solution that enhances existing security without any interference. There are many
advantages of having a DTM due to its ability to fit
into many types of communication networks and its
customizability to address trust based on the network
location, network type, and the type of information
exchange between network nodes. Abdul-Rahman
and Halles mentioned how the existing security covers only the privacy, authenticity, and access control
methods (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997). Privacy
protects information exchange using techniques such
as cryptography. Authentication is achieved using a
digital signature to ensure authorized parties send and
receive messages. Access control ensures that only
the intended party accesses the data. In the IEEE
2030.5 protocol, those listed solutions are addressed
and accommodated. However, there is no way to ensure if the sender of a message is a malicious party
since there is no existing method to verify if an authentic node sent the message. Hence, security needs
a fourth element: “trustworthiness.”
There are many features a DTM can have. Fernando et al. presented descriptions of many trust
model characteristics and DTM design considerations
of how the DTM can be present in digital communication networks such as peer-to-peer, hierarchical, or
centralized (Fernando et al., 2021). They also provided descriptions of trust model components such as
storage solutions, trust equations, etc.
A primary goal of designing a DTM system for
the power grid is to ensure its design is fit for the digital communication network architecture. Another is
to ensure abnormalities of messages are captured correctly. Also, trust is calculated, and using historical
data or real data to calculate trust is also essential.
A dynamic DTM design can also have a trust vector
where a set of variables can independently identify a
specific abnormality as a sign of attack. For example, a trust vector can use a variable to evaluate the
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changes in the frequency of communication, where
communication increase is a sign of a DoS attack.
A vital feature of the DTM System is its ability to
monitor digital communication on a network without
interference. One part of the DTM System has predetermined knowledge of actor behavior, the type of
messages exchanged, and the order they need to be
sent/received. With this knowledge, the DTM System can compare the ongoing messages exchanged
between actors and their behavior and identify abnormalities. The DTM System is also able to classify
messages to be indeterminate. The flexibility of the
DTM System ensures it does not make rigid classifications of indeterminate activities yet still flags them
for authority figures to evaluate.
One scenario of a DTM system is shown in Figure 3 (Fernando et al., 2021). As illustrated in this
Figure, the DTM on the client side receives a raw input message from an actor. The input classifier at the
DTM client processes the raw data and classifies the
message to be expected, unexpected, indeterminate,
disconnect, or none, along with the message sent time
and transit time, and information about the sender of
the message.
A message is classified as expected if the message
is in order and all the required message content is
present for a specific transaction. A message is classified as unexpected if it is out of order or contains
values out of range or message fields containing different data types than expected. An input message is
classified as indeterminate if the DTM is unable to
classify the message precisely. A message is classified as disconnect if a DER device does not respond
in a timely fashion. An input message is classified as
none if any of the message contents are incorrect or
missing. The classified message is processed in the
trust equation evaluation block following classification. The trust equation evaluation block takes in the
content generated by the input classifier block and the
trust vector, MVoT.
The trust vector can contain variables such as:

Figure 3: This figure shows the overall connection of the
DTM system. Left of the red dotted lines are components
of the DTM-Client at the SPC. Right of the red dotted lines
are components of the CDTA at the GSP.

Each variable has a corresponding equation that
the trust model uses to calculate a value for that actor
for each specific message. The DTM client updates
the new MVoT variables to the CDTA. The responsibility of the CDTA is to compare against those set of
thresholds for each alert message and send out alerts
to the right authoritative figures/actors if the count exceeds the threshold value.

8

CONCLUSION

Plans to automate the electrical power grid give way
for adversaries to conduct malicious activities. Communication between smart grid components is susceptible to cyber-attacks. In addition, communication
patterns could describe customers’ behavior, violating their privacy. A privacy-preserving scheme for
the smart grid was presented in this position paper.
We conducted a threat analysis to assess the security standing of the design—finally, we discussed how
privacy is preserved through trust-augmented security
measures under the proposed strategy.

• Trust Score
• Distrust Score
• Certainty
• Recent up time
where each variable of the MVoT can detect a specific abnormality, Trust Score quantifies an actor’s
overall trust, while Distrust Score quantifies the actor’s overall distrust. Certainty represents how confident the DTM is of the actor who sent the message.
The DTM MVoT can be expanded to add n number of
variables to detect additional abnormalities.
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